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AMER. HOME v. L & L MARINE (Cont.) 
contributed equally to the accident and the weather encountered 
was not so unusual as to be unforeseeable. 
The resulting damages were properly allocated among the 
parties proportionally according to the comparative degree of 
their fault. L&L had neither a vessel interest nor a cargo interest 
and could not be considered a contributing participant in a 
common nautical venture. L&L was sued merely as a tortfeasor 
and the concept of general-average adjustment, as used by the 
other parties to adjust the damages among themselves, does not 
apply. While the district court's allocation of damages was 
proper, it did not include the costs of hull repair and cargo 
lightering. For this reason the damage award is vacated and 
remanded for reconsideration. . 
The work done by the tug Jaguar was properly classified as 
towage. It was the Cost Guard vessel on the scene that actually 
performed the crucial act of rescue by attaching the floating 
hawser to the Maya, and the Jaguar then merely pulled the 
Maya off the Shoal. The finding of the district court that this 
work would properly be classified as towage rather than salvage 
was affirmed. 
Stephen W. Beyer '92 
CALIFORNIA HOME BRANDS, INC. v. FERREIRA 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 28 March 1989 
871 F.2d830 
Shipowner cannot sue seaman, whose negligence allegedly caused injury to co-seaman, for indemnification or contribution 
based upon shipowner's Jones Act liability to said co-seaman. 
FACTS: In January 1985, Manuel Rebelo, a crewmember of 
the M/V Pan Pacific, sustained personal injuries on board the 
vessel. Rebelo filed a claim for maintenance and cure. In re­
sponse to Rebelo's claim, the shipowners, California Home 
Brands Inc. (CHB), commenced an action for declaratory relief, 
denying responsibility for maintenance and cure. Rebelo 
counterclaimed for negligence under the Jones Act, unsea­
worthiness, and maintence and cure. 
CHB commenced a separate action against Danny Ferreira, 
a co-seaman, for contribution and/or indemnification, claiming 
Ferreira's puported negligence contributed to Rebelo's injuries. 
Ferreira, moved to dismiss CHB's complaint and after a hearing, 
the trial court held that CHB's suit against its own employee for 
indemnity and contribution was barred as a matter of law. 
ISSUE: Is a shipowner-employer who may be liable to an 
injured seaman-employee under the Jones Act entitled to such 
indemnity and contribution from a co-seaman whose negligence 
allegedly caused the injury? 
ANALYSIS: In its affirmation of the district court's decision, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered judgement for 
Ferreira despite numerous arguments by CHB for indemnification 
and contribution. 
The Court explicitly declined to recognize conventional land­
based tort liability theories regarding indemnity or contribution 
from fellow employees, continuing to be guided by rules specifically 
developed in the context of maritime employment. 
Traditional maritime law recognized only two claims by a 
seaman injured in the course of employment - a seaman injured 
while on board a vessel was entitled to "maintenance and cure" 
(which included wages until the end of the voyage), and recovery 
of damages for injuries sustained due to the unseaworthiness of 
the ship The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). A vessel owner's duty 
to provide such "maintenance and cure" is implied as part of the 
employment contract, and this duty is not subject to abrogation 
by the parties. Similarly, the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy 
ship is absolute; once a seaman proved that his injuries were 
caused by the unseaworthy condition of the vessel or its equipment, 
the shipowner was liable regardless of fault. Carlisle Packing 
Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1912). The common law concept 
of negligence as a basis for tort liability was not extended to 
employment injuries at sea until passage of the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. §688 (1920), which created a negligence right of action 
for seamen against their employers. CHB argued that if Congress 
had intended to protect seamen from personal liability, the 
Jones Act would have included an express immunizing provision. 
The Court refused to accept this rationale, stating that the 
purpose of the Act was to benefit and protect seamen by enlarging 
the remedies available to them. The Court concluded that to 
interpret the statute to allow lawsuits against seamen would 
frustrate the beneficial purpose of the Act. 
CHB attempted to further advance its cause of action against 
Ferreira under principles of maritime indemnity and contribution 
established under two prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions. See 
Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling and Refitting Corp., 342 
U.S. 482 (1952) andCooperStevedoringCorp. Inc. v.FritzKople 
Inc., 417 U.S. 106 ( 1974). In Halcyon, a shipowner was sued by a 
longshoreman for injuries sustained on board a vessel. The 
shipowner sought to implead the longshoreman's employer, 
who was otherwise exempted by statute, as a third party de­
fendant. The Supreme Court held that no right of contribution 
existed in such non-collision maritime cases. In Cooper, an 
injured longshoreman sued the vessel owner, who later imp­
leaded the non employer, stevedoring company as a third party 
defendant. The Supreme Court held that the vessel owner was 
entitled to implead such stevedoring company as a joint tort­
feasor. CHB's attempt to wed these holdings to the facts of the 
case at bar was held to be too sweeping. The Court indicated that 
unless a direct cause of action exists by one seaman against 
another for shipboard injuries, the employer can have no right of 
indemnification or contribution from the employee. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's hold­
ing that before any statutory rights were created, a seaman 
could not sue his co-employee for negligence. The Court in 
interpreting the Jones Act concluded that Ferreira could not be 
directly liable to Rebelo and therefore, no basis existed for 
CHB's claim for indemnity against Ferreira. See, CHB. Foods, 
Inc. v. Rebelo, 662 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.CAL.1987). 
CHB also argued that it had a right to indemnity from Fer­
reira on an implied contractual basis, citing the "primary duty 
rule" adopted in Reinhart u. United States, 475 F.2d 151 (9th 
Cir. 1972). (Seaman-employee may not recover from his employer 
for injuries caused by his own failure to perform a duty imposed 
on him by his employment.) The Court held that Reinhart had 
no application in this case because the primary duty rule works 
only to bar a plaintiffs suit for damages when his injury resulted 
from his own breach. It does not create any rights against third 
parties. Given the conditions of maritime employment, the imp­
lication of a covenant of workmanlike performance running 
from the seaman to his employer and entitling the latter to 
indemnity is not a reasonable one. SeeFlunker v. United States, 
528 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975). 
Finally, the policy arguments advanced by CHB for indemnity 
and contribution were rejected by the Court as not in keeping 
with the history and purpose of the Jones Act. The Court cone­
! uded that to subject a seaman to the costs of defending a lawsuit 
by his employer and the threat of ultimate liability would place 
an intolerable burden on what is already considered a difficult 
occupation. See Socony-Vacume Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424 
(1939). 
Alfonso C. Pistone '91 
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